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Notes
STATUTORY REFORM IN CLAIMS AGAINST FOREIGN STATES:
THE BELMAN-LOWENFELD PROPOSAL
I.

INTRODUCTION

The executive branch of the United States Government has
indicated recently that it is re-examining its dominant judicatory role
in the field of sovereign immunity of foreign states. Studies
undertaken in 1966 by the State Department resulted in the
preparation of draft legislation on sovereign immunity that the
Department has been studying for possible presentation to Congress.
The proposed Belman-Lowenfeld legislation would completely remove
the State Department from any role in deciding sovereign immunity
cases.' The proposal itself would subject foreign states to the
jurisdiction of United States federal courts for activities carried on or
having a direct effect in the United States in the same manner that
private persons or corporations are currently answerable for such

activities. The legislation would make foreign states amenable to
process in two types of cases: first, those based on express or implied
contracts entered into, to be performed, or arising out of transactions
in the United States; and, secondly, those based upon personal injury,
death, or damage to property caused by an act or omission of any
officer, agent, or employee of the foreign state while acting within the
scope of his office, agency, or employment within the United States.
Additionally, the proposed statute would facilitate obtaining jurisdiction over foreign states in actions falling within the parameters of
the two categories outlined above since it separates jurisdiction from
personal service and attachment of property. Consequently, the

1.

Belman, New Departures in the Law of Sovereign Immunity, 1969

AM. SoC. INT'L

PROC.

L. 182, 185-86; Leigh, New Departuresin the Law of Sovereign

Immunity, 1969 PRoc. AM. SOC. INT'L L. 187; Lowenfeld, Claims Against
Foreign States--A Proposal for Reform of United States Law, 44 N.Y.U.L. REv.

901 (1969). Monroe Leigh is a practicing member of the District of Columbia Bar.
Belman and Lowenfeld have both served as Deputy Legal Advisers for the State
Department since 1964. Lowenfeld was designated to oversee the preparation of
the original study for the Department which led to the preparation of the draft
legislation. For a version of the legislation which is currently in the possession of
the Legal Adviser see Lowenfeld, supra, at 936-38.
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statute, in effect, eliminates completely the executive branch from the
current system of adjudicating claims against foreign states.2
When the proposed statute was announced at the annual meeting of
the American Society of International Law in 1969, there was a
difference of opinion on whether the legislation presented constitutional problems in its delegation of power from the executive to the
judicial branch.3 Neither the text of the Constitution nor the current
case law provides a clear solution to this problem. This note will
examine the development and the current problems of sovereign
immunity law in the United States. Next, a view of the role of the
legislative branch, as well as the proposed statute, will be shown.
Thereafter, a consideration of possible solutions will be undertaken in
an effort to determine what resolution is most consistent with the
underlying foreign affairs policies of the United States executive and
judiciary.
The proposed statute makes no provision for an executive suggestion of immunity, although presently the courts consider such a
suggestion conclusive. Consequently, this note will examine whether
such a provision, either written into the statute or as an implied
exception to it, is required by the constitutional power of the

executive over foreign affairs. The answer to this question will depend
on whether the executive must have the ability to make such a
suggestion in order to exercise his constitutional executive power,
particularly over foreign affairs. An analysis of the case law on
sovereign immunity will be presented in order to determine whether
the power to grant immunity to a foreign sovereign presently is
recognized as a constitutional executive power. Finally, an analysis of
the executive's role in foreign affairs will be attempted in order to
determine whether the power to grant immunity is one that the
executive must possess in order to fulfill his constitutional role in
foreign affairs.

II.

DEVELOPMENT

The dominant factor in the development of the law of sovereign
immunity has been a conscious effort on the part of the judicial
2. All other types of claims, and particularly those relating to political acts of
foreign states or to activities occurring outside the jurisdiction of the United
States, would be barred. Lowenfeld, supra note 1, at 903, 936-38.
3. "Dr. Miriam L. Rooney asked the panel whether it could foresee any
constitutional problems in the statutes' delegation of power from the Executive to
the Judicial Branch. Professor Cardozo replied in the affirmative, while Mr.
Belman replied, 'no.' "Lillich, Comments, 1969 PRoc. AM. Soc. INT'L L. 194,
201.
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branch to protect the executive from being embarrassed before other
sovereigns in the conduct of foreign relations.4 In the process, several
different rules have developed governing the grant of sovereign
immunity and the scope of judicial proceedings once a suggestion of
immunity has been made by the executive.
Until 1952, the United States adhered to the so-called "absolute"
theory of sovereign immunity. That is, any foreign sovereign was
immune from private suit in the courts of the United States. The
traditional rule was enunciated by Chief Justice Marshall in The

Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon.5 In that case, a libel against a
warship in the possession and control of the Emperor of France was
dismissed, the Court reasoning that national ships of war that entered
the ports of a friendly power were exempted from the exercise of
jurisdiction because of an implied license to pass through a sovereign's
territory. 6 The Court pointed out, however, that a sovereign was
capable at any time of destroying this exemption and subjecting the
vessels of a foreign sovereign to the jurisdiction of its courts.7 More
than one hundred years passed before immunity was granted to a
non-military vessel of a foreign state. In Berizzi Brothers Co. v. S.S.
Pesaro,' the Supreme Court was faced with the issue whether a ship
owned and possessed by the Italian Government, and operated by it in
the carriage of merchandise for hire, was immune from arrest under
the process bond on a libel in rem by a private suitor. The Court
upheld dismissal of the action on the basis that the vessel was owned
by the Government of Italy:
We think the principles [announced in The Schooner Exchange] are
applicable alike to all ships held and used by a government for a public

4. Courts of all nations recognize the immunity of foreign sovereigns. This
limitation on their jurisdiction originated in an era of personal sovereignty when
the domestic ruler was above the law. Failure to grant similar treatment to a
foreign prince indicated either hostility or superiority. In order to avoid any
friction which might result from offending the dignity of another sovereign, the
local state exempted him from its jurisdiction. The claims of individuals were
sacrificed in the national interest. Note, The JurisdictionalImmunity of Foreign
Sovereigns, 63 YALE L.J. 1148 (1954).
5. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
6. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 140-41. The Court, however, premised its reasoning
on the fact that "[t] he perfect equality and absolute independence of sovereigns
have given rise to a class of cases in which every sovereign is understood to waive
the exercise of a part of that complete exclusive territorial jurisdiction which has
been stated to be the attribute of every nation." Id. at 136.
7. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 144.
8. 271 U.S. 562 (1926).
Vol. 5-No. 2
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purpose, and that when, for the purpose of advancing the trade of its people
or providing revenue for its treasury, a government acquires, mans and
operates ships in the
carrying trade, they are public ships in the same sense
9
that war ships are.
Notwithstanding its noteworthy holding, the importance of the
Pesaro case for purposes of this note lies in the reasoning employed to
arrive at the holding. The Court did not rest the outcome on foreign
policy grounds, but rather indicated that it was the public nature of
the act-jure imperii- that was determinative.' 0 Moreover, in the case
itself, the State Department argued that immunity should not be
granted to a commercial vessel in a claim arising out of a commercial
transaction, but the Department of Justice disagreed and declined to
suggest immunity to the Court."
In Ex parte Republic of Peru, 12 the question of the immunity of
government-owned merchant vessels was presented again to the
Supreme Court. In this case, the Republic of Peru was the sole owner
of the merchant vessel, and the Court affirmed its earlier holdings that
vessels owned by foreign governments were immune from suit in the
courts of the United States. The Court, however, did not rely solely
on past precedent or international law to support its decision, but
instead based its holding on a suggestion transmitted to the district
court by the State Department, which, in effect, asked the court to
grant immunity. 1 In holding that the suggestion by the State
Department was conclusive, Mr. Chief Justice Stone opined in a now
famous statement:

9. 271 U.S. at 574.
10. For a discussion of the jure imperii and jure gestionis aspects of the Pesaro
case, see Lauterpacht, The Problems of JurisdictionalImmunities of Foreign

States, 28 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 220, 224 (1951).
11. The Pesaro, 277 F. 473, 479-80 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1921); 2 G. HACKWORTH. DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 429-30, 438-39 (1941);
Cheatham & Maier, PrivateInternationalLaw and Its Sources, 22 VAND. L. REV.

27, 84-86 (1968); Lowenfeld, supra note 1, at 904.
12. 318 U.S. 578 (1943).
13. There was a formal recognition by the State Department of the Peruvian
claim of immunity. Then, on May 5, 1942, the State Department wrote the
Attorney General and requested him to tell the court that the State Department
"accepts as true the statements of the Ambassador concerning the steamship,
Ucayali, and recognizes and allows the claim of immunity." On June 29, 1942,
the letter was submitted to the court and the Attorney General prayed that the
claim of immunity recognized by the State Department be given full force and
effect, and that the vessel be declared immune from the jurisdiction and process
of the court. The Ucayali, 47 F. Supp. 203, 205(E.D. La. 1942).
Spring, 1972

STA TUTOR Y REFORM IN CLAIMS AGAINST FOREIGNSTA TES

397

The principle is that courts may not so exercise their jurisdiction, by the
seizure and detention of the property of a friendly sovereign, as to
embarrass the executive arm of the Government in conducting foreign
relations. 'In such cases the judicial department of this government follows
the action of the political branch, and will not embarrass the latter by
assuming an antagonistic jurisdiction.' United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196
(1882).1 4
In Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman," s

on the other hand, the

suggestion that was filed by the State Department in the district court
merely accepted as true Mexico's contention that the vessel was its
property. The suggestion otherwise refrained from recognizing Mexi-

co's claim of immunity since possession by Mexico was lacking." The
Supreme Court, again speaking through Chief Justice Stone, affirmed
the lower courts' opinions that had determined that the Mexican
vessel was
to suit."
immunity
immunity

not immune from jurisdiction and consequently was subject
The Court reasoned that it was not for the courts to deny
that the Government had decided to allow, or to allow
on new grounds that the Government had not deemed

14. 318 U.S. at 588. The importance of the quotation from the Lee case
will be discussed in the section dealing with the constitutional underpinnings of
the proposed congressional enactment, pp. 407-13 infra.
15. 324 U.S. 30 (1945).
16. Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 143 F.2d 854 (9th Cir. 1944).
17. In United States v. Guaranty Trust Co., 304 U.S. 126, 134 (1938), Chief
Justice Stone gave clear indications of his conception of the doctrine of sovereign
immunity as being essentially a "principle of comity." The issue in that case
involved the amenability of a foreign sovereign, suing as plaintiff, to the bar
imposed by local statutes of limitations. While upholding the immunity of
domestic sovereigns to local statutes of limitations because of public policy as
"complete," Chief Justice Stone held that the extension of a similar immunity to
sovereigns suing as plaintiffs was not justified because very different considerations apply where the sovereign avails itself of the privilege, likewise extended by
comity, of suing in the courts of the United States. The significance of Chief
Justice Stone's reasoning is apparent when viewed in the context of the opinion of
the court of appeals, which he reversed, and which had held that the principle of
sovereign immunity was "axiomatic" in American law and "so sweeping in
character" as to extend to all classes of action, in rem or in personam, under
"principles and practices of international law." The court of appeals further
reasoned that, otherwise, the "perfect equality" upon which the admission of
states to membership in the international community was based would be
destroyed. United States v. Guaranty Trust Co., 91 F. 2d 898, 900-03 (2d Cir.
1937). For an excellent criticism of Chief Justice Stone's rationale, see Jessup,
The Litvinov Assignment and the Guaranty Trust Company Case, 32 AM. J.
INT'L.L.

542, 543 (1938).
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proper. It added that recognition by the courts of an immunity upon
principles that the political branch of the Government had not
sanctioned might be embarrassing to the executive."8
By 1952 it was clear, therefore, that the doctrine of absolute
immunity as enunciated in The Schooner Exchange had been eroded
in favor of granting to the State Department a substantial amount of
leeway, both in determining the doctrine of immunity to be applied in
domestic courts and in deciding particular cases. 9 In that year in a
statement entitled, "Change of Policy on Sovereign Immunity of
Foreign Governments," or the so-called "Tate letter," announced that
"hereafter" the State Department would follow the restrictive theory
of immunity in considering requests of foreign governments for
immunity from suit.20 The Department stated, "[T] he immunity of
the sovereign is recognized with regard to sovereign or public acts (jure
imperii) of a state, but not with respect to private acts (jure
gestionis)."' Although the Department disclaimed any power to
control the courts, the letter expressed the hope that the courts would
follow the policy enunciated therein.2 2 Though this piece of
executive legislation left several areas unclear,2 3 it seemed apparent
that accurate application of the new policy would depend less on
political judgment regarding the effect of litigation on foreign
relations than on a close examination of the particular facts bearing on
the classification of the activity on which the claim was based.
As a result of the pronouncements in the Tate letter, writers
speculated that because of the Hoffman rationale, the letter would be
18. 324 U.S. at 35-36.
19. Lowenfeld, supra note 1, at 905.
20. Letter from Acting Legal Adviser, Jack B. Tate, to Department of Justice,
May 19, 1952, in 26 DEP'T STATE BULL. 984 (1952).
21. Id.
22. The first acceptance by the Supreme Court of the guidelines established in
the Tate letter is found in National City Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356
(1955). In that case, a permissive counterclaim by a foreign sovereign plaintiff was
allowed when the State Department failed to enter a suggestion of immunity.
23. There seemed to be three areas which were left unresolved by pronouncements in the Tate letter: (1) the Tate letter made no attempt to define the
distinction between the activity of a state lure imperii and the activity of a state
fure gestionis; (2) because of the views taken in the Ex parte Peru and Hoffman
cases, it was unclear who should make the determination called for in the lure
gestionis-jure imperii distinction; and (3) even where the activity on which the
claim was based was clearly one not entitled to immunity under the restrictive
theory, it was not clear how a suit against a foreign sovereign was to be initiated.
For a more detailed analysis of these problem areas, see Lowenfeld, supra note 1,
at 907.08.
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treated as authoritative by the judiciary.2 4 These speculations were
confirmed by the Second Circuit's decision in Victory TransportInc.
v. Comisario General.25 In that case, the court reasoned that since the
Department had made clear through the Tate letter that its policy was
limited to the restrictive theory of immunity, the court must apply
the public-private dichotomy to the facts in issue. With the State
Department's failure to provide a test by which to delineate private
and public acts, the court proceeded to fashion its own standard for
implementing the distinction.2 6 The court held that if a claim of
immunity was not allowed by the Department, then immunity should
be denied unless it was plain that the activity in question fell within
one of the categories of strictly political or public acts about which
sovereigns have traditionally been quite sensitive.27 The court noted
the following categories:
(1) internal administrative acts, such as expulsion of an
alien;
(2) legislative acts, such as nationalization;
(3) acts concerning the armed forces;
(4) acts concerning diplomatic activity; and,
(5) public loans.2 8
As a result, since the activity of defendant in Victory Transport,
a branch of the Spanish Ministry of Commerce, was not a strictly
public or political act, but was rather in the nature of a private
commercial act, the court held that immunity should be denied.2 9
The pre-eminence of the executive as authoritative law-maker in
sovereign immunity cases, however, is demonstrated by the fact that
while courts consider themselves bound by expressions of executive

24. E.g., Cheatham &Maier, supra note 11, at 86.
25. 336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965).
26. This decision has been referred to as "the most recent authoritative
statement of the sovereign immunity doctrine in the United States, and it
certainly represents the furtherest step thus far away from the doctrine of
absolute immunity." Lowenfeld, The Sabbatino Amendment-InternationalLaw
Meets Civil Procedure, 59 AM. J. INT'L L. 899, 907 (1965).

27. 336 F.2d at 360.
28. 336 F.2d at 360. Note that the court found support for its indicia of lure
imperii in Lalive, L'Immunitd de Jurisdiction des Etats et des Organisations
Internationales,3 RECUEIL DES COURs 205, 285-86 (1953).

29. This holding followed closely the case of New York & Cuba Mail S.S. Co.
v. Republic of Korea, 132 F. Supp. 684 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), in which the State
Department declined to suggest immunity because the act in question was not
purely governmental in character.
Vol. 5-No. 2
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policy, the State Department retains its freedom to determine
immunity on a case by case basis.3" In at least four cases, 3" the
judiciary has taken note of either overriding political considerations or
a suggestion of immunity by the State Department and has allowed a
claim of immunity which, under the principles of the Tate letter later
clarified in Victory Transport, would otherwise have been refused.
Illustrative of these cases is IsbrandtsenTankers, Inc. v. Presidentof
India. 2 In that case plaintiff, Isbrandtsen Tankers, sued the President
of India in a federal district court for losses from unreasonable delays
in unloading grain vessels. In the charter party India had agreed to
settle all disputes in the New York district court. After India filed an
answer to the complaint, the State Department sent a formal
suggestion of immunity to the district court. Plaintiff averred that the
court retained jurisdiction over the controversy despite the Department's suggestion, reasoning that defendant had waived its immunity
both by the charter party and by a general appearance in court. The
district court found that the formal written suggestion of immunity
precluded any further inquiry by the court and dismissed the case. On
appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
affirmed on the ground that courts are bound by a State Department
suggestion of immunity, notwithstanding the commercial nature of the
transaction, a contractual waiver of immunity and the foreign
sovereign's general appearance in court. Although from the foregoing
it is clear that an executive suggestion will be authoritative to the
judiciary because of the Hoffman decision, there has been growing
concern over the State Department's role, as well as conflict over the
application of the so-called Tate letter doctrine.

III.
A.

THE BELMAN-LOWENFELD PROPOSAL

The Role of the Legislative Branch

Certain members of the State Department who were dissatisfied

with the Hoffman rule and the Tate letter doctrine concluded that the
30. Cheatham & Maier, supra note 11, at 86.
31. Isbrandtsen Tankers Inc. v. President of India, 446 F.2d 1198 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 985 (1971), noted in 5 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 264
(1971); Chemical Natural Resources, Inc. v. Republic of Venezuela, 420 Pa. 134,
215 A.2d 864, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 822 (1966); Rich v. Naviera Vacuba, S.A.,
295 F.2d 24 (4th Cir. 1961); New York & Cuba Mail S.S. Co. v. Republic of
Korea, 132 F. Supp. 683 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
32. 446 F.2d 1198 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 985 (1971).
Spring, 1972
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Department was the wrong branch to perform the essentially judicial
task necessary for the implementation of these doctrines. Belman's
explanation for the Department's penchant toward a legislative
solution stressed the fact that since the official adoption of the
restrictive theory in the Tate letter, the foreign relations criterion had
been almost completely eliminated from consideration by the courts.
As a result, continued determination of sovereign immunity problems
by the executive not only would be unnecessary but also would
constitute legal judgments that could be decided more satisfactorily

by using judicial procedures. 33
The role of Congress in this field has rarely been the subject of
extensive inquiries by the practicing bench and bar or textwriters.
Until Belman announced the proposal at the meeting of the American
Society of International Law in 1969, no concrete proposals for
specific legislation had ever been prepared or submitted to Congress
for consideration.3 4 Whenever references were made by courts or
scholars to the role that Congress could play in this area, they usually
were enunciated in such general or speculative terms that they hardly
afforded a basis for expecting any meaningful legislative reform to
solve the problems of sovereign immunity. In general, the remarks
made by attorneys and textwriters had been limited to relatively
obvious declarations that in the event that Congress should enact
legislation on the matter, the courts naturally would be governed
thereby.35
Nothwithstanding the dominant role played by the executive and
the judiciary, Congress should be responsible for its inconspicuous role
in the area of sovereign immunity. Despite its far-reaching legislative
prerogative, it has failed to show any interest in the problems of

33. Belman, supra note 1, at 184. Accord, Lowenfeld, supra note 1, at
918-19.
34. T. GIUTTARI, THE AMERICAN LAW OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
319-21 (1970).
35. The statements made by the Supreme Court in the Pesaro case, pointing
out that its decision to extend absolute immunity to the trading vessels of foreign
states was premised upon the absence of any treaty or statute "evincing a
different purpose," tends to illustrate the typical attitude toward possible
congressional contributions in this field. 271 U.S. at 574. In the past, several
authorities urged legislative enactment as the ideal solution. See, e.g., Hervey, The
Immunity of Foreign States When Engaged in Commercial Enterprises:A Proposed

Solution, 27 MICH. L. REV. 751, 773-75 (1929); Note, The Jurisdictional
Immunity of Foreign Sovereigns, 63 YALE L.J. 1148, 1171 (1954); Note,
Sovereign Immunity for Commercial Instrumentalities of Foreign Governments,
58 YALE L.J. 176, 182 (1948).
Vol. 5-No. 2
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immunity or even to initiate any studies to resolve these problems.
The legislature has the power to define the jurisdiction of federal
courts and can even subject foreign states to their jurisdiction.
Regardless of the passive attitude displayed in the past by Congress
toward sovereign immunity problems, should the draft BelmanLowenfeld legislation be enacted it would have dramatic consequences
for the American law of sovereign immunity.
B. Problemsand Criticisms
The basic criticism of the current practice is that it classifies parties
rather than transactions in determining whether the controversy may
be litigated in a United States court. When parties, including
foreign governments, have acted in a way that would subject them to
suit-either by entering into a contract or by retaining agents whose
performance may result in tort liability-they should be held
responsible for the legal consequences of their actions, regardless of
the fact that one is a foreign sovereign. To permit either party to
escape this legal liability is basically unfair. 3 6 Furthermore, the
existing practice in sovereign immunity cases fails to take into account
the extent of state trading in the modern world. Some scholars argue
that the State Department cannot enunciate a legal policy concerning
state trading because it is involved heavily in the political and
As a result, state trading enterprises
diplomatic factors of each case.
of foreign governments often are awarded an immunity by the State
Department that their private American competitors do not enjoy
either in the United States or.abroad. 38 This argument is based on the
36. It has been argued that subsection (b) of the proposed statute remedies
this problem by stating the types of transactions in which a sovereign may incur
legal liability. Lowenfeld, supra note 1, at 915. The effect of this provision on
infra.
foreign relations is discussed at pp.
37. Rich v. Naviera Vacuba, S.A., 197 F. Supp. 710 (E.D. Va.), aff'd, 295
F.2d 24 (4th Cir. 1961); New York & Cuba Mail S.S. Co. v. Republic of Korea,
132 F. Supp. 684 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Cardozo, Judicial Deference to State
Department Suggestions: Recognition of Prerogative or Abdication to Usurper?,
48 CORNELL L. REV. 461, 472 (1963); Cheatham & Maier, supra note 11, at 86;
Timberg, Sovereign Immunity, State Trading, Socialism, and Self-Deception, 56
N.Y.U.L. REV. 109, 116-19 (1961); Comment, 60 MicH. L. REV. 1142, 1145

(1962).
38. "The evolution away from the absolute doctrine of immunity as
expressed in the Schooner Exchange case.., has been substantially broadened, as
was necessitated by the changing conditions of the political and commercial
world." Et Ve Balik Kurumu v. B.N.S. Int'l Sales Corp., 25 Misc. 2d 299, 304, 204
N.Y.S.2d 971, 977 (Sup. Ct. 1960); Schmitthoff, The Claim of Sovereign
Immunity in the Law of International Trade, 7 INT. & COMP. L.Q. 452 (1958).
Spring, 1972

STATUTORY REFORM IN CLAIMS AGAINST FOREIGNSTATES

403

assumption that in the great majority of cases the State Department
does not follow the restrictive theory of the Tate letter, but instead

bases determinations of immunity on political factors.
A closely related criticism of the existing practice is that the
decision of whether an activity is public or private is basically a legal
one and the State Department is not the best institution to make such
a decision or to apply such a distinction.3 9 If the Department is in
fact making a "legal" decision, as it does whenever it attempts to
apply the restrictive theory,4" such a decision could better be made
by the courts. In addition, the distinction between public and private
acts, which an application of the restrictive theory makes mandatory,
has been criticized as unworkable. 4
The classic illustration of the
problem is a suit on a contract to purchase shoes for a foreign army.
Since this example is merely illustrative, an attempt to resolve the
question is beyond the scope of this note.

There are a number of procedural problems that are presented by
the present sovereign immunity practice, although some predate the
Tate letter and its restrictive theory. Because an ambassador or other
diplomatic person may not be served with process,42 it is difficult to

obtain jurisdiction over the foreign sovereign. Additionally, execution
is not permitted on the property of a sovereign"
39.

and, therefore, it is

Belman, supra note 1; Lowenfeld, supra note 1; Timberg, supra note 37;

Casenote, 8

HARV. INT'L

L.J. 388 (1967).

40. Ocean Transp. Co. v. Republic of Ivory Coast, 269 F. Supp. 703 (E.D. La.
1967); Petition of Petrol Shipping Corp., 37 F.R.D. 437 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), affl'd,
360 F.2d 103 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 931 (1966); Chemical Natural
Resources, Inc. v. Republic of Venezuela, 420 Pa. 134, 215 A.2d 864(1966);
Comment, supra note 37, at 1145.
41. Belman, supra note 1; Lowenfeld, supra note 1; Timberg, supra note 37;
Comment, supra note 37.
42. Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v. Moore, 345 F.2d 978 (D.C. Cir. 1965). Section (c)
of the proposed statute permits such service. This practice is criticized by the
panel, Lillich, supra note 3. The conflicting result which the procedural problems
of sovereign immunity may reach with the policies of the Hickenlooper
amendment are discussed in Maier, Sovereign Immunity and Act of State:
Correlative or Conflicting Policies, 35 U. CIN. L. REV. 556 (1965). For a
discussion of the procedural problems in the sovereign immunity area, see
Comment, Sovereign Immunity- The Restrictive Theory and SurroundingJurisdictionalIssues, 15 CATH. U.L. REV. 234 (1966).
43. See New York & Cuba Mail S.S. Co. v. Republic of Korea, 132 F. Supp.
684 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (good example of the problems of getting an unwilling
foreign sovereign into court). Contra, Banco Nacional v. Steckel, 134 So. 2d 23
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1961); Gonzales v. Industrial Bank of Cuba, 33 Misc. 2d 283,
227 N.Y.S.2d 456, aff'd, 12 N.Y.2d 33, 186 N.E.2d 410, 234 N.Y.S.2d 210

Vol. 5-No. 2
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difficult to enforce a judgment once obtained. Furthermore, problems
of waiver of immunity44 and the proper method for claiming
immunity4" have arisen.
C.

The Belman-Lowenfeld Proposal

In response to these criticisms, the State Department drafted the
Belman-Lowenfeld legislation. Basically, the draft legislation envisions
three major changes in the current law of sovereign immunity. First,
instead of basing the exercise of jurisdiction upon the public-private
distinction of the restrictive theory of immunity, the proposed
legislation would, in effect, create a new basis of jurisdiction by the
courts. In essence, foreign governments would be subject to suits in
specified types of contract and tort claims in a manner quite similar to
that in which the United States Government is presently liable.4 6 In
the field of contracts, the claims allowable against foreign states would

include those arising from breach of contract or from transactions
performed in or having a reasonable relation to the United States. Tort
claims would be allowed only for negligent or non-intentional torts;
moreover, the act in question would have to have been performed in

the United States, or if outside, to have been committed in
conjunction with activities carried on within the United States.4"
Belman has justified this policy on the grounds that:

(1962). The proposed statute would not change the practice, evidenced by both
the State Department and the c6urts (New York at least), that allows attachment
where the action sued upon is of a commercial nature, regardless of the
defendant's sovereign status. See generally Note, The American Law of Sovereign
Immunity Since the Tate Letter, 4 VA. J. INT'L L. 75 (1964).
44. National City Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356 (1955); Victory
Transp. Inc. v. Comisaria General, 336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964); Rich v. Naviera
Vacuba, S.A., 197 F. Supp. 710 (E.D. Va.), affl'd, 295 F.2d 24 (4th Cir. 1961);
Petition of Petrol Shipping Corp., 37 F.R.D. 437 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); United States
of Mexico v. Schmuck, 293 N.Y. 264, 56 N.E.2d 577 (1944).
45. Compania Espanola de Navegacion Maritima v. The Navemar, 303 U.S. 68
(1938); Ex parte Muir, 254 U.S. 522 (1921); Punete v. Spanish National State,
116 F.2d 43 (2d Cir. 1940).
46. Belman, supra note 1, at 185.
47. Id. The limitation of suits to negligent torts caused Lillich to observe that
"[n] o effective means of bringing suits for intentional torts has been provided."
See Lillich, supra note 3, at 195. Lowenfeld's draft provides simply for "a claim
for personal injury or death or damage to property caused by an act or omission
of any officer ... of such foreign state." Construing this language broadly, such
language could encompass unintentional torts to the extent that they are not
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[h] olding a foreign government responsible for its contracts and negligent
torts is consistent with the position our government has undertaken with
regard to its own immunity ....
Governments enter into contracts advertently, and it is not unreasonable to expect them to live up to their
promises.... Torts are not generally the result of conscious action,
certainly not of government policy. But like the rest of us, governments can
insure against
possible liability or else have the wherewithal to insure
4
themselves. 8
The second major change contemplated by the proposed legislation
would introduce a much broader concept of jurisdiction for cases
involving foreign states. Accordingly, if a foreign state were "doing

business" in the United States, such activity would be sufficient to
vest federal courts with jurisdiction over the contract or the tort
arising from such business activity. In other words, personal jurisdiction would attach by virtue of the "act" committed by the foreign

sovereign, and the need to attach property of foreign states to secure
in rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction would be eliminated. 49 This
change, therefore, would make foreign states liable virtually to the
same extent as foreign corporations.
Thirdly, and perhaps most significantly, the proposed legislation
would eliminate completely the present decision-making role of the
State Department in the adjudication of sovereign immunity cases.

Additionally, jurisdiction over claims against foreign states would be
exclusively reserved to the federal courts. Since there would be
simplified procedures available for commencing suits and for serving
notice on foreign states, the tendency of plaintiffs to attach property

specifically precluded by the immunity section of the proposed law. This section
provides that foreign states would still retain full immunity from suits "based on"
or "calling into question" legislation, decrees, or orders of that state, or a claim
arising from an act or omission of an officer or agent performed in the execution
of a public law or of a discretionary function or duty. Lowenfeld, supra note 1, at
928, 936-38.
48. Belman, supra note 1, at 185. Compare the similar proposal for
legislation, advocated sixteen years earlier, in Note, The JurisdictionalImmunity
of Foreign Sovereigns, supra note 35, at 1165-72.
49. Belman, supra note 1, at 185-86. Under the new procedure proposed by
the draft law, service of process could be effected by mailing it to the foreign
state's embassy or other authorized representative in the United States. The
purpose of such service, however, would be largely to provide notice of the
proceeding to the foreign state and not to vest the courts with jurisdiction.
Lowenfeld, supra note 1, at 936-38. Such notice would satisfy the due process
requirements of the fifth amendment of the Constitution and, thus, foreclose
collateral attack on that ground.
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for jurisdictional purposes would be removed. Linked with the
provision specifically foreclosing seizure of property for purposes of
execution, the proposed law would obviate any need for the executive
to intervene in the judicial process.5 0 Not surprisingly, however, the
draft statute grants immunity for four specific governmental actions.5
Although it may not actually constitute a substantive change in
current American law, another important consequence of the proposed legislation is the provision upholding the absolute immunity of
foreign states from execution. Belman and Lowenfeld have rationalized this provision by stressing the importance of foreign policy
considerations. In their opinion, the seizure of property for satisfying
judgments not only causes "unnecessary and undesirable provocation"
in international relations but also is "severely detrimental" to the
activities of the state whose property is taken. 2
Potentially, however, the State Department's proposal on execution
immunity re-establishes the absolute theory of sovereign immunity
with possibly harsher consequences for private litigants than were
endured when absolute immunity was applied only for jurisdictional
purposes. The private plaintiff suing a foreign state is placed at a great
disadvantage by a clause that provides absolute immunity from
execution. The absolute discretion afforded a sovereign defendant in
deciding whether to comply with the judgment reasonably could lead
to situations in which the plaintiff may be compelled to accept a
settlement of his claim on terms far less favorable than would be the
case if he were able to resort to the normal procedures provided by

50. Lowenfeld, supra note 1, at 930. Another great advantage for the
proposed legislation would be, according to Lowenfeld, the elimination of the
quasi.judicial hearing held by the State Department to determine whether a
suggestion of immunity should be sent to the courts. Id. at 912-13.
51. Lowenfeld, supra note 1, at 937. Section (e) provides that no action shall
be maintained against a foreign state "(1) based upon legislation, decrees, or
orders of that state, (2) calling into question the legislation, decrees, or orders of
that state, (3) based upon a claim arising out of an act or omission of an officer,
agent, or employee of that state in the execution of a public law, regulation,
decree, or order, or the exercise or performance of a discretionary function or
duty, (4) based upon a public debt of the foreign state."
52. Id. at 928; Belman, supra note 1, at 186. One authority, arguing the
contrary position, has stated that "[t]here has been no convincing showing that
such a rule would lead to embarrassment." If foreign states will pay their
judgments, "the courts will never be faced with the unpleasant task of ordering
execution against a foreign state." Leigh, supra note 1, at 192.
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law for the enforcement of his judgment.5 3 In effect, the plaintiff
who obtains a judgment that might never be recovered faces far more
severe consequences than he faces from the instability that has
resulted from efforts to apply the Tate letter distinction between
public and private acts. Notwithstanding this shortcoming in the
proposed draft, the legislation itself appears to be a step forward for
American law in determining an equitable solution to the questions
presented in sovereign immunity cases.
The proposed Belman-Lowenfeld draft appears to present little
conflict with other foreign states in their application of the law of
immunity.5 4 The supreme court of Italy has enunciated its understanding of the state of the law simply by quoting the Latin maxim,

"Princips in alterius territorioprivaties."'5 As Lowenfeld has pointed
out, "it seems fair to say that the scope of possible variation within
the contemporary international legal system in the area of sovereign
immunity is so wide as to cast doubt on whether there are any
restraints on the choice made by states." 6 Perhaps it is best to
summarize that the parameters for immune activities, claims and
properties are for each state to determine on its own either by statute,
rule of court or foreign office policy."

IV.

CONSTITUTIONAL

UNDERPINNINGS OF THE

PROPOSED STATUTE

Proceeding under the assumption that the executive branch,
through the Legal Adviser to the State Department, will submit the
proposed statute to Congress for its approval, consideration will be
given now to the constitutional powers that enable Congress to enact
such a measure. Although there is a difference of opinion among
scholars on whether the proposal presents constitutional problems, 8

53. See

FED.

R. Civ. P. 69.

54. See generally Lauterpacht, The Problem of JurisdictionalImmunities of
Foreign States, 28 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 220, 250-72 (1951).
55. "The prince is a private citizen in the territory of another." Tani v.
Russian Trade Delegation in Italy, [1948] Ann. Dig. 141, 144 (No. 45) (Court of
Cassation, Italy).
56. See Lowenfeld, supra note 1, at 930.
57. But cf. Lowenfeld, supra note 1, at 930-31; Lauterpacht, supra note 54,

at 248.
58. See Lillich, supra note 3.
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judging from the litigation that followed the enactment of the
Hickenlooper amendment 9 it appears that constitutional challenges to
the Belman-Lowenfeld Act would be raised in subsequent sovereign
immunity cases. Since, in essence, the proposed legislation prescribes
certain jurisdictional changes, the threshold question is whether
Congress is authorized to define the jurisdiction of federal district
courts. The short answer to the question is that Congress does have
such power.
In general, the power of Congress to regulate the jurisdiction of the
lower federal courts is derived from the power to create tribunals
under article I,6 the necessary and proper clause,61 and the clause in
article III that vests the judicial power in the Supreme Court and such
inferior courts as "the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish." 62 Balanced against these provisions, however, are the
phrases in article III that, in effect, provide that the judicial power will
be vested in lower federal courts and will extend to nine classes of
cases. The question becomes, therefore, how far does this power
extend. In Martin v.Hunter'sLessee,63 Justice Story, by way of dicta,
declared that Congress must create inferior federal courts and vest in
them all the jurisdiction that they were capable of receiving. This
statement was strongly criticized by the dissent,64 and more than
thirty years passed before the dispute was settled in Sheldon v. Sill,6
where the validity of section 11 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 was
directly questioned.66 The Supreme Court held unanimously that

59. 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1970).
60. "The Congress shall have Power... [t] o constitute Tribunals inferior to
the supreme Court." U.S. CONST. art. I. § 8.
61. "The Congress shall have Power... [t] o make all Laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all
other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States,
or in any Department or Officer thereof." U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8.
Since the Constitution outlined only the broad limits of the judicial power,
leaving the details to Congress, the distribution and appropriate exercise of the
judicial power must be made by laws passed by Congress. See Rhode Island v.
Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 721 (1838).
62. "The judicial Power of the United States shall be vested in one supreme
Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain
and establish." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
63. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816) (dictum).
64. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 374 (dissenting opinion).
65. 49 U.S. (8 How.) 440 (1850).
66. In Sheldon v. Sill, the assignee of a negotiable instrument filed a suit in a
circuit court even though no diversity of citizenship existed between the original
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since the Constitution had not established the inferior courts or
distributed to them their respective powers and since Congress had the

authority to establish such courts, it could define their jurisdiction
and could vest, withhold or regulate the jurisdiction of any court of its
own creation in light of the nine cases enumerated in article III.67
Sheldon v. Sill, and the line of cases following it,6 articulated two
elements necessary to confer jurisdiction on the lower federal courts:
first, the Constitution must have given the courts the capacity to
receive it; and secondly, an act of Congress must have conferred it.
The decisions have concluded that the manner in which the lower
federal courts acquire jurisdiction, its character, the manner of its
exercise and the objects of its operation are given without check or
limitation to the wisdom of Congress. 69
On its face, the proposed legislation of Belman and Lowenfeld
appears to satisfy the two requirements that were enunciated in the
Sheldon case. First, the requirement that the Constitution must have
given the courts the capacity to receive the jurisdiction has been
satisfied by the specific provisions of article III, which provide that
"[t] he judicial Power shall extend.., to Controversies ... between a
State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or
Additionally, Congress has found it necessary and proper
Subjects." 7
to codify the provision of article III, quoted above." Finally, the
jurisdiction that will be granted to the inferior federal courts will be
bestowed pursuant to an act of Congress in satisfaction of the
second requirement. Since this is so, it is clear that federal courts
may have their jurisdiction regulated by Congress. It is also clear that

parties to the mortgage. The circuit court entertained jurisdiction despite the
prohibition against such suits in § 11 and ordered a sale of the property in
question. On appeal to the Supreme Court, counsel for the assignee contended
that § 11 was valid because the right of a citizen of any state to sue citizens of
another in the federal courts flowed directly from article Ill and Congress could
not restrict that right.
67. 49 U.S. (8 How.) at 448.
68. See, e.g., Federal Power Comm'n v. Pacific Co., 307 U.S. 156 (1939);
Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 233-34 (1922); Ladew v. Tennessee
Copper Co., 218 U.S. 357, 358 (1910); Venner v. Great Northern Ry., 209 U.S.
24, 35 (1908).
69. Mayor v. Cooper, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 247, 251-52 (1867).
70. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
71. "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions when
the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of
interest and costs and is between ...citizens of a State, and foreign states or
citizens or subjects thereof." 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) (1970).
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they are empowered to entertain suits between private parties and
foreign states only at the discretion of Congress.
The crucial problem presented by congressional legislation controlling the jurisdiction of sovereign immunity cases is the potential
conflict with the plenary powers of the executive branch in its
conduct of foreign relations. In United States v. Curtiss-Wright

Corp., 2 the Supreme Court examined the powers of the President in
this field; Mr. Justice Sutherland noted:
It is important to bear in mind that we are here dealing not alone with an
authority vested in the President by an execution of legislative power, but
with such an authority plus the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power

of the President as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of
international relations-a power which does not require as a basis for its
exercise an act of Congress, but which, of course, like every other
governmental power, must be exercised in subordination to the applicable
provisions of the Constitution. It is quite apparent that if, in the
maintenance of our international relations, embarrassment-perhaps serious
embarrassment-is to be avoided and success for our aims achieved,
congressional legislation which is to be made effective through negotiation
and inquiry must often accord to the President a degree of discretion and
freedom from statutory restriction which would not be admissible were
domestic affairs alone involved.73
From the Curtiss-Wright case it is clear that if Congress is to pass
legislation that infringes on the foreign relations powers of the
executive, it must do so cautiously to avoid attack on the basis of its
being unconstitutional.
Perhaps the best answer to this problem is to ground the
constitutionality of the proposed act in the powers granted to
Congress pursuant to the commerce clause of the Constitution. This
answer is similar to the solution found in the legislative aftermath of
the Sabbatino case,74 which dealt with the act of state doctrine. The
close analogy between these two doctrines is probably best illustrated

by Lowenfeld's statement that sovereign immunity "is a cousin,
though not a sister, of the act of state doctrine... ."" The portion of
the Hickenlooper amendment7 6 that was enacted after the Sabbatino
decision provided that cases arising out of expropriations, although
occurring within the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign, should be

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

299 U.S. 304 (1936).
299 U.S. at 319.20.
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
See Lowenfeld, supra note 26, at 904.
78 Stat. 1013, as amended, 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1970).
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decided on their merits in direct contrast to the international rule
regarding acts of states. In Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr," the

court not only upheld the constitutionality of the Hickenlooper
amendment but also held that the amendment did not infringe upon
the power of the President over foreign relations and, thus, did not
violate the separation of powers doctrine. The analogy to the
Hickenlooper amendment is compelling, since if Congress can enact
legislation that is not only contrary to international law but also
clearly a matter normally handled by the executive, Congress should
reasonably be able to enact sovereign immunity legislation that does
not conflict with international law and that has, in fact, been
proposed by the executive.
For the purpose of this note, it is important that the Farr court
linked the constitutionality of the Hickenlooper amendment to the
commerce clause of the Constitution. 8 The application of the act of
state doctrine affects foreign investments and the flow of international
trade and commerce, 79 and the application of sovereign immunity has
a similar effect. The power granted to Congress by article I, section 8,
clause 3, of the Constitution "to regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations" is broad and plenary. The "power... is complete in itself,
may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no
limitations, other than are prescribed in the Constitution." 8 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has held that "...

. any rule which is

intended to foster, protect, and conserve commerce, or to prevent the
flow of commerce from working harm to the people of the nation, is
within the competence of Congress."'" As a result, it cannot be
seriously disputed that the proposed statute would be a valid exercise
of congressional power under the commerce clause. This is especially
true when the tort and contract provisions are viewed in consideration
of the ability of the plaintiff to recover the benefit of the bargain in
the case of a breach of contract or, in the case of a negligent tort, to
recover for damages to goods in shipment.
Were there any doubt of Congress' power to enact the legislation
pursuant to authority in the commerce clause, it would be dispelled
by the grant of additional power under article I, section 8, clause 18,
"[t] o make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying
into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by

77. 243 F. Supp. 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
78. 243 F. Supp. at 972.
79. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 433-36 (1964).

80. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196 (1824).
81. Mulford v. Smith, 307 U.S. 38, 48 (1938).
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this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any
Department or office thereof."
Consequently, it appears unnecessary to look further for sources of
congressional power. It is at least arguable, however, that the
Belman-Lowenfeld proposal comes from the executive department
itself, and therefore, there could be no conflict either with the
foreign relations powers or the separation of powers concept within
the United States Government. This appears to be a make-weight
argument, however, that fails to address itself directly to the power of
Congress to pass the draft legislation.
Furthermore, a solution for upholding the constitutionality of the
proposal might be grounded in the power of Congress to declare war.
This argument is implied from the reasoning of the Ex partePeru case,
which established the pre-eminence of the State Department in
determining the issue of sovereign immunity. Citing United States v.
Lee,82 the Court in the Peru case reasoned that the judiciary should
not act in a fashion that would embarrass the executive branch. The
quotation that was used from the Lee case, 83 however, was preceded
by a sentence that appears to be significant for upholding the validity
of the instant proposal. This sentence, which discussed the English law
of sovereign immunity, stated in part that "it has been uniformly held
that these (sovereign immunity problems) were questions the decision
of which, as it might involve peace or war, must primarily be dealt
with by those departments of the government which had the power to
adjust them by negotiation, or to enforce the rights of citizens by
war." 84 Because of this quotation and the implicit incorporation of
its meaning into the sentence that was quoted in Ex parte Peru and
numerous other immunity cases, it could be argued that sovereign
immunity cases have an impact on both the executive and legislative
branches of the federal government. First, it affects the executive's
foreign relations powers because of the potential embarrassment that
might be suffered. Secondly, it affects the legislative branch because
of the possibility of war. This second aspect, therefore, is key to the
present discussion since it is Congress alone that has the constitutional
power to declare war.8" Since this is so, it is reasonable to conclude
that coupled with the necessary and proper clause of article I, the

82. 106 U.S. 196 (1882).
83. See text accompanying note 14 supra.
84. 106 U.S. at 209.

85. "The Congress shall have Power... [t]o declare War. . . ." U.S. CoNsT.
art. I, § 8. This argument does not attempt to distinguish the de jure right of
Congress to declare war and the de facto ability of the executive to wage war.
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constitutionality of the proposed statute could be grounded in the war
powers of Congress and thereby not be deemed to infringe upon the
executive's power to conduct foreign relations.
Finally, it may well be that the Belman-Lowenfeld proposal falls

within the ambit of implied congressional power over foreign
relations."s
Further discussion of this and other theories, however,
appears foreclosed in the light of the clear congressional power to
enact the legislation under the commerce clause of the Constitution.

V.

CONSTITUTIONAL

STATUS OF AN EXECUTIVE SUGGESTION OF
SOVEREIGN

IMMUNITY

A. An Examination of Existing Law
This section will first present the bases of the executive suggestion
of sovereign immunity as enunciated in the existing case law.8 7 Next,
cases that narrow the executive power to suggest immunity will be
discussed. Finally, the effect of the Sabbatino case 88 and its
aftermath on sovereign immunity law will be considered.
1. The Bases for an Executive Suggestion.-A number of theories
have been advanced as bases for the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
One reason for granting immunity to a foreign sovereign is comity.8 9
It also has been argued that the practice of granting immunity was
based originally on the inherent weakness of states comprising the
international community and that there is no basis in fact for
immunity today.9 ° Furthermore, the doctrine has been assumed to

86.

Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918); Henkin, The Law of

the Land and ForeignRelations, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 903, 913-22 (1959).
87. The case law and language discussed cannot be considered binding
precedent because the precise issue of the constitutionality of such an executive
suggestion has not been raised in the way it will be raised by the proposed statute.
The decided cases are, however, indicative of the way the Court is likely to
analyze this problem.
88. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 193 F. Supp. 375 (S.D.N.Y. 1961),
aff'd, 307 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1962), rev'd, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
89. Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Moore, 345 F.2d 978 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Victory
Transp. Inc. v. Comisaria General, 336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964); Cardozo,
Congress Versus Sabbatino: ConstitutionalConsiderations,4 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 297, 298 (1966).
90.

Comment, The Relationship Between Executive and Judiciary: The State

Department as the Supreme Court of InternationalLaw, 53 MINN. L. REV. 389,
396-97 (1968).
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apply only to a "friendly sovereign" and only where there is "a
common interest to be served by a grant of immunity."9 1 Whatever
the reason for the doctrine, some form of sovereign immunity has
traditionally been recognized in international law.
The doctrine of sovereign immunity first received judicial recogni-

tion in the United States in The SchoonerExchange v. McFadden.92
In that case, the United States appeared and requested that a French
naval vessel, which had been driven into a United States port by rough
weather, be granted immunity from the jurisdiction of United States
courts. The Court held that although the United States had complete
sovereign powers within its borders, by virtue of its membership in
the community of nations it impliedly had immunized the property of
a foreign sovereign from suit. 3 The Court stated that the United
States, as a sovereign, could withdraw the immunity, "[b]ut until
such [sovereign] power be exerted in a manner not to be misunderstood, the sovereign cannot be considered as having imparted to the
ordinary tribunals a jurisdiction, which it would be a breach of faith
to exercise."' 94 The opinion did not indicate, however, the branch or
branches of the government that had the power to exercise the
sovereignty of the United States in order to revoke the implied
consent. It appears that there has been only one case in which the
Court addressed itself to this problem. In Berizzi Bros. Co. v. S.S.
Pesaro,9" the Court granted immunity to a merchant ship owned by
the Italian Government despite an executive assertion that immunity
was not necessary. It applied the reasoning of The Schooner Exchange
and stated:
The decision in the Exchange therefore cannot be taken as excluding
merchant ships held and used by a government from the principles there
announced. On the contrary, if such ships come within those principles they
must be held to have the same immunity as 96war ships, in the absence of a
treaty or statute evincing a different purpose.
Presumably, this dicta implies that a grant of immunity by the
domestic sovereign can be withdrawn by a "treaty or statute."

Consequently, either the executive and the Senate, or the whole
Congress, has the constitutional power to exercise sovereignty in such
a way as to revoke the implied grant of immunity.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Cardozo, supra note 37, at 468.
11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 144.
11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 146.
271 U.S. 562 (1926).
271 U.S. at 574 (emphasis added).
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The next comprehensive discussion of the idea that courts should

accept an executive suggestion of immunity as binding occurred in
1943. In Ex parte Republic of Peru,9 7 the Court granted immunity to
a vessel acting in the service of the Peruvian Government on the
strength of a State Department statement that it "accepts as true the
statements of the Ambassador concerning the steamship Ucayali and
recognizes and allows the claim of immunity.""8 Relying on an earlier
statement that "it is the duty of the courts to release the vessel" under
these circumstances, 9 9 the Court stated:
When the Secretary elects, as he may and as he appears to have done in this
case, to settle claims against the vessel by diplomatic negotiations between
the two countries rather than by continued litigation in the courts, it is of
public importance that the action of the political arm of the Government
taken within its appropriate sphere be promptly recognized, and that the
delay and inconvenience of a prolonged litigation be avoided by prompt
termination of the proceedings in the district court.
More specifically, the judicial seizure of the vessel of a friendly foreign
state is so serious a challenge to its dignity, and may so affect our friendly
relations with it, that courts are required to accept and follow the executive
determination that the vessel is immune.
This practice is founded upon the policy, recognized both by the
Department of State and the courts, that our national interest will be better
served in such cases if the wrongs to suitors, involving our relations with a

friendly foreign power, are righted through diplomatic
negotiations rather
00
than by the compulsions of judicial proceedings.'

The Court grounded judicial recognition of an executive suggestion of

immunity on three bases: first, that this was the appropriate sphere of
action for the executive as a political branch of the government;

secondly, that such questions were likely to affect foreign relations;
and finally, that the national interest would be better served if such
suggestions were considered binding by the courts. There was no
implication, however, that this was a constitutional power of the
executive that could not be abrogated by Congress. Instead, the

97. 318 U.S. 578 (1943).
98. 318 U.S. at 582.
99. Compania Espanola de Navegacion Maritima v. The Navemar, 303 U.S. 68
(1938).
100. 318 U.S. at 587-89. This statement was repeated in Republic of Mexico
v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 35 (1945).
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decision appeared to be based on the practical realities of international
politics.' 01
This conclusion was further solidified by language used in two cases
decided in 1955. In the first case, National City Bank v. Republic of
China,' I0 the Supreme Court was faced with a situation in which
there had been no State Department suggestion concerning immunity.
In holding that a foreign sovereign was not immune from a
counterclaim to the extent of a set-off, the Court stated: "[T] he
privileged position of a foreign state is not an explicit command of the
Constitution. It rests on considerations of policy given legal sanction
by this Court."' I I In following a State Department suggestion that
property of a foreign sovereign was immune from attachment, a
district court in the same year stated that "[I]t has long been
established that the Court's proper function is to enforce the political
decisions of our Department of State on such matters. This course
entails no abrogation of judicial power; it is a self-imposed restraint to
avoid embarrassment of the executive in the conduct of foreign
affairs."' 04 Interestingly, since the court did not find a constitutional
source for the executive power to suggest immunity, but rather
denominated it as a "self-imposed restraint," it appears that such a
restraint could also be removed by the court.
Whatever the source of power for the suggestion, courts have not
been willing to inquire into the reasons for a State Department
suggestion of immunity. In the case of Rich v. Naviera Vacuba,
S.A.,0 the district court refused to deny effect to a suggestion of
immunity even though the, suggestion was, in the court's view,
obviously not based on the restrictive theory of the Tate letter.' 0 6 In
the same case on appeal, the Fourth Circuit refused to hear plaintiff's
contention that the title of the foreign sovereign was defective. The
court stated: "We think that the doctrine of the separation of powers
under our Constitution requires us to assume that all pertinent
considerations have been taken into account by the Secretary of State
in reaching his conclusion."' 07 Since the constitutional separation of
101. An analysis of the need of the executive to have conclusive control over
immunity questions in order to operate effectively in foreign affairs appears at
pp. 422-30 infra.
102. 348 U.S. 356 (1955).
103. 348 U.S. at 359.
104. New York & Cuba Mail S.S. Co. v. Republic of Korea, 132 F. Supp. 684,
686 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
105. 197 F. Supp. 710 (E.D. Va. 1961).
106. 197 F. Supp. at 724.
107. Rich v. Naviera Vacuba, S.A., 295 F.2d 24, 26 (4th Cir. 1961).
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powers renders decision-making concerning immunity exclusively an
executive function, the authority of the executive may then be based
on article II of the Constitution.' 08
Two recent cases support the reasoning that the executive suggestion must be conclusive in order to avoid "embarrassing" the
executive.' 09 Both were cases in which the executive had made no
suggestion to grant or deny immunity, and both held that the courts
should deny immunity where the State Department had indicated,
either directly or indirectly, that immunity need not be accorded.' 10
Consequently, if a grant of immunity is required to avoid embarrassment, the executive can so declare; if it is not required, there is no
reason to deny a litigant his day in court. Although not grounded in
an express constitutional mandate, this conclusion is based on the
sound policy that the executive should not be unduly hampered in the
conduct of foreign affairs.
Potentially, the question whether an executive suggestion will be
honored by a state court presents the clearest situation in which the
courts will have to find a constitutional basis for the executive
suggestion. It appears that the federal courts may be required by the
Supreme Court to adhere to such a suggestion for non-constitutional
reasons, but to require the state courts to do so would necessitate a
constitutional mandate. Unfortunately, no case has been found where
the Court reversed a state court decision in which the state court
denied effect to an executive suggestion because of a lack of
constitutional executive power to make such a determination.
Although there are state court decisions honoring such a suggestion,'
they have been decided on the same policy grounds as the
federal court cases,' 12 and the question of a constitutional basis for
the suggestion was not considered.
Courts of a few states, most notably New York, have implied that
they are not unwilling to question the practical effect of a suggestion

108. U.S. CONST. art. I.
109. Victory Transp. Inc. v. Comisaxia General, 336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964);
Ocean Transp. Co. v. Republic of Ivory Coast, 269 F. Supp. 703 (E.D. La. 1967).
110. 336 F.2d at 358; 269 F. Supp. at 705.
111. Chemical Natural Resources, Inc. v. Republic of Venezuela, 420 Pa. 134,
215 A.2d 864 (1966); Weilamann v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 21 Misc. 2d 1086,
192 N.Y.S.2d 469 (Sup. Ct. 1959). This idea was given at least lip service in
United States of Mexico v. Schmuck, 293 N.Y. 264, 56 N.E.2d 577 (1944); Et Ve
Balik Kurumu v. B.N.S. Int'l Sales Corp., 25 Misc. 2d 299, 204 N.Y.S.2d 971
(Sup. Ct. 1960).
112. See cases cited note 111 supra.
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of immunity made by the executive. 1 3 The most serious problems
have concerned, first, what constitutes a waiver of immunity;
secondly, whether the property in question actually belongs to a
foreign sovereign; and finally, whether there could be an execution on
expropriated property that was in the possession of a foreign
sovereign.
In Stephen v. Zivnostenska Banka,1 144 a New York state court was
able to avoid a suggestion of immunity. Plaintiff was suing for
assets of a Czechoslovakian bank that had been nationalized.1 1 5
Although the State Department had sent a letter stating that it
"recognizes and allows the claim of the Czechoslovak Government
that such property in the United States is immune from execution or
other action analogous to execution," 1 1 6 the Appellate Division held
that the property in question did not belong to the Czechoslovak
Government and permitted execution on the property. The court
reasoned:
[T] he suggestion of immunity... was not intended to be a determination
by the Department of any controversy ... as to the ownership of any
securities involved in the case ....It follows that the Department had no
intention of suggesting that any property not owned by the Government of
Czechoslovakia was immune.... 117
It appears clear, however, that if the suggestion of immunity by the
State Department had been based on a constitutional mandate, then a
state court should not be able to avoid it with what are essentially
legal niceties. Additionally, the "embarrassment" to the executive
would have been the same whether the property was subject to
execution because there was no sovereign immunity, or because it was
held to have been owned by someone other than the Czechoslovak
Government. Consequently, this case illustrates the potential foreign
relations problems that are caused when a party questions the
ownership of nationalized property.
The same criticisms can be made of the cases that have found an
implied waiver of immunity by a foreign government. In United States

113. See Note, supra note 43, at 86-90; Comment, supra note 37, at 1146.
114. Stephen v. Zivnostenska Banka, 15 App. Div. 2d 111, 222 N.Y.S.2d 128
(1961).
115. The assets were located in New York and the suit was brought there. A
lower court judgment had appointed a receiver for the assets of the nationalized
bank and thereby effectively tied up the assets.
116. 15 App. Div. 2d at 115, 222 N.Y.S.2d at 134.
117. 15 App. Div. 2d at 117, 222 N.Y.S.2d at 135.
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of Mexico v.Schmuck,' 1 8 the State Department recognized the claim

of immunity by Mexico "in the absence of evidence of such consent in
,119 In that case, a commercial contract
the present instance .
provided that any disputes arising under the contract were to be
determined by the laws of the state of New York." 20 The New York
Court of Appeals held that the contract provision was an implied
waiver of sovereign immunity. Nevertheless, the problems caused in
relations between the United States and Mexico by this adjudication
would have been the same whether the suit was permitted because of a
denial of immunity, or because it was permitted by an implied
"waiver" that the Mexican Government obviously did not wish to be
effective." 2' A similar New York case held that commencement of a
suit in the courts of that state was a waiver of immunity on a
counterclaim in excess of a set-off arising out of the same transaction.' 22 While these holdings are not conclusive of the issue, they
do cast doubt on the notion that the basis for judicial deference to an
executive suggestion is found in an express constitutional mandate.

In conclusion, courts have traditionally acceded to a suggestion of
immunity primarily on the basis of policy considerations rather than
on constitutional grounds. The courts avoid restricting the flexibility
of the executive in the international political arena. The language of
existing cases, however, does not seem to establish a constitutional
mandate for giving binding effect to an executive suggestion. Whether
executive conclusiveness is required in order to carry out the
executive's constitutional duties will be discussed in section B, below.
2. Sabbatino and Its Aftermath. -Although Banco Nacional de
Cuba v. Sabbatino' 2 3 centered on the act of state doctrine, the Court

also discussed the constitutional basis of that doctrine in a way that
sheds light on the role of the executive vis-'a-vis the courts in foreign
affairs. In the Sabbatino case, sugar belonging to an American-owned
Cuban corporation was nationalized by the Cuban Government after it

118. United States of Mexico v. Schmuck, 293 N.Y. 264, 56 N.E.2d 577
(1944).
119. Id. at 270, 56 N.E.2d at 579.
120. Id. at 268, 56 N.E.2d at 579.
121. See note 44 supra.
122. Et Ve Balik Kurumu v. B.N.S. Int'l Sales Corp., 25 Misc. 2d 299, 204

N.Y.S.2d 971 (Sup. Ct. 1960). The only Supreme Court holding since the Tate
letter permitted a counterclaim against a foreign sovereign to the extent of a
set-off, which was all the counterclaim demanded. National City Bank v. Republic
of China, 348 U.S. 356 (1955).
123. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
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had been loaded onto German shipping vessels by the American buyer.
The sugar was shipped to New York, where the assignee of the Cuban
Government delivered the bills of lading to the buyer without
receiving payment. The district court held that it could determine title
to the proceeds of the payment due from the buyer even though to do
so would require it to examine the validity of the foreign act of
state.' 24 The court of appeals affirmed, taking note of two letters
sent to the court from the State Department that implied that the
Department did not object to the failure to apply the act of state
doctrine." 2I The Supreme Court reversed and held that the act of
state doctrine did apply.' 26 In determining that it was improper for
the judiciary to examine the validity of a foreign act of state, the
Court reasoned:
[I] t cannot of course be thought that "every case or controversy which
touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance." Baker v. Carr,
369 U.S. 186, 211. The text of the Constitution does not require the act of
state doctrine; it does not irrevocably remove from the judiciary the
capacity to review the validity of foreign acts of state.
The act of state doctrine does, however, have "constitutional" underpinnings. It arises out of the basic relationships between branches of
government in a system of separation of powers. It concerns the
competency of dissimilar institutions to make and implement particular
kinds of decisions in the area of international relations. The doctrine as
formulated in past decisions expresses the strong sense of the Judicial
Branch that its engagement in the task of passing on the validity of foreign
acts of state may hinder rather than further this country's pursuit of goals
both for itself and for the community of nations as a whole in the
international sphere. 127
Consequently, to the extent that a sovereign immunity question tends
to have as much effect on the conduct of foreign relations as an act of
state question, this language strongly implies that sovereign immunity
is a matter that the constitutional structure of the United States
Government leaves to the non-judicial branches. The case does not

124. The Sabbatino district court held that since (1) the expropriation was
not reasonably related to a public purpose, (2) the expropriation act classified
United States nationals differently from others, (3) the nationalization failed to
provide adequate compensation, and (4) the United States Government had
declared the taking to be violative of international law, it was necessary to
conclude that the act of state was in violation of international law and was not
subject to the act of state doctrine. 193 F. Supp. 375, 386 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
125. 307 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1962).
126. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
127. 376 U.S. at 423.
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attempt to allocate the non-judicial powers to specific branches of the
government. This was done, however, by the Hickenlooper amendment.1"28 After providing that the courts of the United States shall
not apply the act of state doctrine to give effect to a foreign
confiscation that was in violation of the principles of international
law, the amendment stated:

This subparagraph shall not be applicable.., in any case with respect to
which the President determines that application of the act of state doctrine
is required in that particular case by the foreign policy interests of
2 9 the
United States and a suggestion to this effect is filed on his behalf ....1

This provision, in effect, inverts the presumption. Previously, the act
of state doctrine would be applied unless the executive suggested
otherwise (the Bernstein exception): under the Hickenlooper amend0
ment, the doctrine will not be applied unless the executive suggests it. 3
It has been argued that the Hickenlooper amendment is an infringement by Congress of the executive's prerogative to decide to what extent
the demands of comity require the United States to give effect to the
acts of friendly foreign governments.' 3 1 Since the executive, acting
through the State Department, has the constitutional responsibility
for the conduct of foreign affairs, it has been argued that the
executive possesses the ability to control public actions such as court
cases that would effect those relations.' 32 It has been suggested that
the Hickenlooper amendment invades the constitutional domain of the
executive by requiring him to speak when he prefers to remain silent,
and thereby hampers his conduct of foreign affairs.' I The suggestion
also has been made that the amendment would be unconstitutional
without the provision that grants the executive power to withdraw a
case on act of state grounds.'

128. 78 Stat. 1013, as amended, 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1970).
129. 78 Stat. 1013, as amended, 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1970).
130. Cardozo, supra note 89, at 300. See generally, e.g., Collinson, Sabbatino:

The Treatment of International Law in United States Courts, 3 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 27 (1964).
131. Cardozo, supra note 89, at 297.
132. Cardozo, supra note 37, at 482. This article was written prior to the final
decision of the Supreme Court and the subsequent enactment of the Hickenlooper
amendment.
133. Cardozo, supra note 89, at 300.
134. Maier, supra note 42.
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B.

The ConstitutionalNecessity of Conclusive Executive
Power to Suggest Immunity

This section will examine the question whether the executive must
have the power to control the immunity determination in order to
fulfill his constitutional role in foreign affairs. The discussion will
focus on whether sovereign immunity is the type of decision over

which the executive must have power under an implied "necessary and
proper" clause.1 3 I
1. The Constitutional Executive Power over Foreign Affairs.13 6 -United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp.1 31 is the leading case
concerning the power of the executive over foreign affairs. In that case
the President, acting pursuant to specific authorization by Congress,
was challenged on his prohibition of the sale of arms to an unsettled
South American country. In upholding the President's action, the
Court found, first, that his power was an attribute of sovereignty
possessed by the federal government:
It results that the investment of the federal government with the powers of
external sovereignty did not depend upon the affirmative grants of the
Constitution. The powers to declare and wage war, to conclude peace, to
make treaties, to maintain diplomatic relations with other sovereignties, if
they had never been mentioned in the Constitution, would have vested in
the federal government as necessary concomitants of nationality .... As a
member of the family of nations, the right and power of the United States
in that field are equal to the right and power of the other members of the
international family. 138
Furthermore, the Court found that the powers necessary to operate
effectively in the international arena were powers necessary to the
federal government, and that the President alone had the power to
operate as the international representative of the nation.1 3 9 The Court
based its holding not merely on the legislative delegation of power to
the President, but also on "the very delicate, plenary and exclusive

135. Maier,supra note 42.
136. See generally E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT 170-226 (1957).
137. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
138. 299 U.S. at 318. This opinion has been criticized for its statement that
sovereignty passed from Great Britain to the Government of the United States,
since that ignores the existence of the Articles of Confederation. However, as a
good constitutional holding that the United States does in fact have these powers
of sovereignty, it is now unquestioned.
139. "In this vast external realm, with its important, complicated, delicate,
and manifold problems, the President alone has the power to speak or listen as a
representative of the nation." 299 U.S. at 319.
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power of the President as the sole organ of the federal government in
,4 0 As a result, the specific
the field of international relations .. .
problem becomes whether the President must have the power to
conclusively suggest immunity of a foreign sovereign in order to
perform this function as the "sole organ" in foreign relations, and
whether the Court is willing to make such a necessity a constitutional
requirement upon enactment of the Belman-Lowenfeld proposal. 4 1
2. Necessity of Executive Control in Immunity Problems.-Three
facts typically are present in situations in which sovereign immunity
questions arise: first, a foreign sovereign or its property is involved in
the litigation; secondly, the issues presented tend to affect an existing,
and sometimes delicate, diplomatic situation; and finally, property
rights typically are involved rather than fundamental personal liberties.
By definition, a claim for sovereign immunity involves either a
foreign sovereign, an agency of the sovereign, or a state-owned
corporation. Consequently, determinations of immunity have a

potential effect on international relations. Similarly, at least one
writer has observed a tendency of the State Department to apply the
restrictive theory of the Tate letter to friendly nations, but not to
Communist and other governments with whom relations are less
warm. 1 4 2 This observation indicates that the State Department
decides questions of immunity by examining its potential effects on
United States foreign relations and implies that such decisions
necessarily involve determinations of whether foreign sovereigns will
be called into United States courts.
Furthermore, decisions whether to grant immunity typically are
made in the context of state-to-state relations and necessarily affect
those relations. Two of the major sovereign immunity cases in United
States courts, Ex Parte Republic of Peru and Republic of Mexico v.

140. 299 U.S. at 320.
141. The view has been advanced, both in case law and by writers in this area,
that the basis of granting sovereign immunity is "comity." See generally Hellenic
Lines Ltd. v. Moore, 345 F.2d 978 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Chemical Natural Resources,
Inc. v. Republic of Venezuela, 420 Pa. 134, 215 A.2d 864 (1966); Cardozo, supra
note 37. Due to the nature of the executive role in foreign affairs, it has been
argued that the executive should have control over all matters of "comity." The
same suggestion has been made for matters connected with the act of state
doctrine. Cardozo, supra note 89. However, labeling decisions as "comity"
problems does not explain why this should be an executive decision rather than a
judicial one.
142.

Comment, supra note 37, at 1144.
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Hoffman,1 43 have stated directly that when the State Department
suggests immunity, "[t] he national interests will best be served when
controversies growing out of judicial seizure of vessels of friendly
foreign governments are adjusted through diplomatic channels rather
than by the compulsion of judicial proceedings.", 1 4 4 Courts have
recognized that determinations of immunity affect foreign relations,
or at least have that potential. This recognition is the basis for the
current policy of giving conclusive effect to an executive suggestion of
immunity.14 The situation presented by the Rich case is illustrative.
With a United States commercial airliner in Havana airport and
Congress and the U.S. press enraged over the hijacking, it was
imperative for the conduct of relations with Cuba that the State
Department be able to command the release of the hijacked Cuban
vessel held in Norfolk, Virginia.
A third important fact that customarily exists in sovereign
immunity cases is the American claimants' assertion of property
rights. Although these rights enjoy constitutional protection,' 46 they

have not received the strict protection that has been afforded to
fundamental personal rights. Nevertheless, an analysis of the cases
indicates that the Supreme Court has been more willing to permit the
executive to do what it must in order to operate effectively in foreign
affairs when only property rights are being infringed
than when
14 7
political and criminal procedural rights are involved.
Having established the typical fact situation, it is necessary to
examine why the executive needs to have the power to control
sovereign immunity determinations. The factors that go into the
decision to grant or deny immunity are potentially different if the

143. Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30 (1945); Ex parte Republic
of Peru 318 U.S. 578 (1943).
144. 324 U.S. at 34.
145. See cases cited note 143 supra. The courts have often stated that they
must give effect to a State Department suggestion of immunity to "avoid
embarrassment" of the executive in foreign affairs. E.g., Victory Transport Inc. v.
Comisaria General, 336 F.2d 354, 358 (2d Cir. 1964); Rich v. Naviera Vacuba,
S.A., 197 F. Supp. 710 (E.D. Va.), aff'd, 295 F.2d 24 (4th Cir. 1961); New York
& Cuba Mail S.S. Co. v. Republic of Korea, 132 F. Supp. 684 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). If
suggestions of immunity did not have at least a potential effect on foreign
relations, there would be no tendency to embarrass the executive if they were not
honored.
146. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
147. Compare United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942) with New York
Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) and Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1

(1957).
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executive rather than the judiciary makes the decision. Presumably,
both the executive and the courts consider the policy of the restrictive
theory of immunity and attempt to apply the distinction between acts
jure imperii and jure gestionis as set forth in the Tate letter. The
courts should make their decisions whether to grant immunity solely
on the basis of this distinction and any other clarifications of the
The problem arises in
distinction that cases have provided. 1 4
identifying what other considerations the State Department is likely
to use in arriving at its final decision. 4 '
When the international political situation dictates, the State
Department has not hesitated to ignore the policy of the Tate letter
and make its decision to grant immunity on other factors.' 5 0 As was
noted previously, at least one writer has come to the conclusion that
the State Department tends to apply the restrictive theory of
immunity to friendly nations and to grant immunity to Communist
nations almost absolutely."' Such determinations obviously involve
the realities of the international situation at the time the decisions are
made. This fact has been implicitly recognized by the courts in giving
binding effect to executive decisions, and explicitly recognized at least
once.' 52
Another factor that is reported to affect the State Department's
determination of immunity is the interest of the Justice Department.' I The Justice Department defends actions against the United
States ,brought in foreign countries. In doing so, it follows United
States policy to pay its liabilities and rarely invokes sovereign
immunity. The Justice Department, then, favors a restrictive view of
immunity in the hope that other nations will reciprocate, especially
when they are defendants, thereby rendering themselves as amenable
to suit as the United States.' -54
148. E.g., Victory Transport Inc. v. Comisaria General, 336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir.
1964).
149. The occasional application of the Tate letter by the State Department is
discussed at pp. 398-400 supra.
150. See sources cited note 37 supra; Cheatham & Maier, supra note 11, at 87;

Fensterwald, United States Policies Toward State Trading, 24 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 369, 388 (1959).
151. See cases cited note 109 supra.
152. Rich v. Naviera Vacuba, S.A., 197 F. Supp. 710, 725 (E.D. Va.), aff'd,
295 F.2d 24, 26 (4th Cir. 1961). See Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578
(1943); Wulfsohn v. Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic, 234 N.Y. 372,
138 N.E. 24 (1923).
153. Timberg, supra note 37, at 115; Comment, supra note 37, at 1147.
154. See, e.g., Lowenfeld, supra note 1.
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Consequently, the fundamental question to be resolved is whether
the consideration of these non-legal factors by the State Department is
necessary and appropriate to the proper conduct of foreign affairs. It
appears that such consideration is both necessary and appropriate.
Because the executive, acting through the State Department, is
charged with the constitutional responsibility of conducting the
foreign relations of the United States, it should be able to control,
within limits, those activities within the United States that affect
foreign affairs. To the extent that the Department considers the
political realities of the international situation in sovereign immunity
cases, and coordinates its foreign relations activities with other
departments of the government, it is carrying out that constitutional
responsibility. The fact that the State Department considers political
factors other than the legal distinctions such as those involved in the
Tate doctrine makes it clear that it, and not the judiciary, is the body
that should make these determinations which are essentially based on
foreign policy.
A second major question is whether a judicial "embarrassment" of
the executive in foreign affairs is constitutionally permissible. A
judicial denial of immunity in situations in which the executive wishes
immunity to be granted violates the general reason for the courts'

granting conclusiveness to executive suggestions. That is, to do
otherwise would risk "embarrassment of the executive in the conduct
of foreign affairs."' 5' Therefore, if the courts deny immunity when
the executive wishes to have it granted, the risk of "embarrassment"
will be great.
The Constitution provides that the executive be the "sole organ" of
the United States concerned with foreign affairs. Traditionally, the
courts have recognized that the realities of international politics
require that the executive have power to exercise control over judicial
determinations of sovereign immunity in order to operate effectively,
or at least "avoid embarrassment," in foreign affairs.' 56 The
interference with the executive's conduct of foreign affairs would be
equally great whether done simply by the courts or by the courts
under a jurisdiction-granting statute passed by Congress. As a result,
the practical effect of international politics and foreign affairs, which
has caused the courts to give conclusive effect to an executive
suggestion of immunity in the past, will motivate them to recognize
and give effect to such a suggestion in the future, regardless of a

155. See, e.g., cases cited notes 143 & 145 supra.
156. See cases cited notes 143 & 145 supra.
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congressional authorization to ignore the suggestion." 5? In effect, the
proposed Belman-Lowenfeld statute may force the courts to reach the

same result on the same policy grounds but to couch their decision in
terms of constitutional executive power rather than "embarrassment
of the executive."
The final question that must be answered in determining the
functional necessity of an executive power to suggest immunity
concerns the consequences to the executive's conduct of foreign
1 8
Proponents of the draft
relations if he does not have this power.
legislation have stated that the statute simply attempts to force
foreign sovereigns to account properly for their contracts and
They contend that the tort liability is part of the cost
torts.' I
reasonably to be anticipated in the maintenance of embassies or
consular establishments, or the operation of commercial and other
enterprises that require agents in the United States. Similarly, they
argue that if a foreign government desires to conduct commercial and
other operations that require it to contract for goods and services, it
must do so with the understanding that it incurs legal obligations
which will be enforced in United States courts.' 6 The proponents
conclude that courts acting under the proposed legislation will not
affect foreign affairs since foreign sovereigns will not be answerable
for political acts in their own countries in United States courts. 16
There are two problems with this argument. First, the hypothesized
fact situation does not cover all the instances in which sovereign
immunity has been raised as a defense. Specifically, it does not cover
1
situations, such as the one in Rich v. Naviera Vacuba, S.A., 62 in
157. The proper role of the courts in adjudicating the hypothetical
controversy in view of their position in the constitutional system of separation of
powers will be discussed at pp. 429-30 infra.
158. This discussion assumes that foreign sovereigns are aware that the
executive lacks the power to grant sovereign immunity.
159. Lowenfeld, supra note 1, at 919-21.
160. "Correspondingly, when a foreign government decides to maintain an
embassy, operate a purchasing mission or keep foreign exchange reserves in the
United States-all activities that the United States encourages as a matter of
national policy-it can reasonably expect to answer for the acts of its agents
connected with these activities, whether the problem be an automobile accident, a
contract claim, or the payment of rent." Lowenfeld, supra note 1, at 920.
161. "The important point is that if foreign governments are held liable in the
same manner as other enterprises doing business in this country, they need not
fear that they will become answerable in United States courts for activities not
connected with this country." Lowenfeld, supra note 1, at 921.
162. Rich v. Naviera Vacuba, S.A., 197 F. Supp. 710 (E.D. Va.), aff'd, 295
F.2d 24 (4th Cir. 1961).
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which property of a hostile sovereign is libelled or attached by a

United States court. Nevertheless, this type of emergency is most
likely to cause the greatest disruption of the foreign relations of the
United States. Secondly, the hypothetical does not account for the
case in which a foreign sovereign has expropriated, without adequate
compensation, property belonging to United States nationals and the
property enters the United States in the possession of the foreign
sovereign. Because of the conflicting national interests in that
situation, the best hope for compensation for all those whose property
has been taken is through negotiation-yet the cloud of a judicial
seizure of the property would impede negotiations. 1 63 Consequently,
in these situations judicial determinations of sovereign immunity
claims would affect the ability of the executive to perform its
constitutional role in foreign affairs.
The more fundamental criticism of this argument is that a
determination of immunity affects foreign relations even in the
hypothetical situation presented at the outset of this discussion. 1 64 In
the final analysis, the decision to grant or to deny immunity will be
viewed as an act of the sovereign of the United States when that
decision is made with a background of tense international politics and
state-to-state diplomatic relations. 65 Since the State Department has
the responsibility of the sovereign in the international political arena,
it should have the power to fulfill properly that responsibility.
The power to make a binding suggestion of immunity to the courts
of the United States should be held to be a power of the executive
because it is necessary for the proper exercise of his constitutional
foreign affairs powers. The executive is charged with the conduct of
foreign affairs. The situations in which claims of sovereign immunity

typically arise have a potentially great effect on foreign affairs. In
addition, the property rights involved have traditionally been held to
be subservient to the power of the executive to operate effectively in
foreign affairs. In determining a question of immunity the executive

considers many international political factors that are unavailable to
the courts but are relevant to a decision that can potentially alter
foreign relations. Finally, a judicial denial of immunity when the
executive desires it to be granted would greatly hinder the executive's

163. For a discussion of the fact situations in which the policies of the
Hickenlooper amendment and the present practice in sovereign immunity cases
conflict, see Maier, supra note 42.
164. See discussion of this point in text accompanying note 145 supra.
165. E.g., Rich v. Naviera Vacuba, S.A., 197 F. Supp. 710 (E.D. Va.), aff'd,

295 F.2d 24 (4th Cir. 1961).
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exercise of his constitutional foreign affairs power. Interestingly, this
problem is not solved by the Belman-Lowenfeld proposal as currently
drafted, since there is no provision for the executive to suggest
immunity even in the atmosphere of a tense international situation.
3. The Role of the Courts in Sovereign Immunity-Now and Under
the Belman-Lowenfeld ProposaL-This section will discuss briefly the
attitude that United States courts have taken toward the propriety of
their examining the question of sovereign immunity when confronted
with a separation of powers objection to such an examination.
Thereafter, this note will examine the question whether the courts can
look behind an executive determination of the necessity of granting
immunity.
One of the first statements to the effect that the courts are not the
proper place to raise questions of sovereign immunity was in Wulfsohn
v. Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic. 1 66 In granting de
facto recognition to the Soviet Government before the United States
had granted formal diplomatic representation, the New York court
granted immunity. The court opined:
The question [of sovereign immunity] is a political one, not confided to the
courts but to another department of government. Whenever an act done by
a sovereign in his sovereign character1 is questioned it becomes a matter of
negotiation, or of reprisals or of war. 67
This idea later was revised and given explicit statement in National
City Bank v. Republic of China.1 68 In that case, the Court permitted
a counterclaim to be asserted against a foreign sovereign to the
amount of a set-off. On the issue of immunity, the Court reasoned:
"The status of the Republic of China in our courts is a matter for
determination by the executive and is outside the competence of this
Court."1 6 9 A district court case handed down the same year granted
immunity that had been suggested by the State Department and
stated: "[I]t has long been established that the Court's proper
function is to enforce the political decisions of our Department of
1
State on such matters." 7 0
The idea was further relied upon in Rich v. Naviera Vacuba,
S.A.
' The Fourth Circuit affirmed a grant of immunity on the basis
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

234 N.Y. 372, 138 N.E. 24 (1923).
Id. at 376, 138 N.E. at 26.
348 U.S. 356 (1955).
348 U.S. at 358.
New York & Cuba Mail S.S. Co. v. Republic of Korea, 132 F. Supp. 684

(S.D.N.Y. 1955).

171. 197 F. Supp. 710 (E.D. Va.), aff'd, 295 F.2d 24 (4th Cir. 1961).
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of a State Department suggestion that immunity be granted. In
response to plaintiff's attempt to contest the title of the goods
claimed by the Cuban sovereign, the court held: "We think that the
doctrine of separation of powers under our Constitution requires us to
assume that all pertinent considerations have been taken into account
by the Secretary of State in reaching his conclusions.""'7 2
It appears from these cases that a possible resolution of the
situation would be to hold that the courts cannot examine an
executive decision that a grant of immunity is proper under the terms
of the proposed statute. This would avoid the necessity of a judicial
determination of whether the power of Congress or the executive is
supreme in this area.' 7 Consequently, the courts could resolve the
dispute by refusing to look behind the "political" decision of the
State Department that immunity was applicable in a particular case.
Such a resolution would leave the executive with the power to obtain
effective immunity for a foreign sovereign. If this solution were
adopted by the courts after the proposed statute was enacted, the

effect would be to reverse the current presumption that immunity will
be denied unless suggested by the executive. If the State Department
were to point to the statute to refuse requests of immunity in all but
the most extreme circumstances, then most of the instances in which
immunity is claimed would be decided by the courts, not by the
Department. The State Department, however, should have the power
to intervene in the exceptional case that required a certain result
purely for reasons of international politics. In1 the
final analysis, this
4
proposed resolution would not be a bad result. 7

VI. CONCLUSION
Perhaps the most important contribution of the Belman-Lowenfeld
draft legislation is that Congress will be in a position to take its first
positive step in settling the conflicting theories that have been applied

172. 295 F.2d at 26.
173. Admittedly, such a result would beg the question and effectively decide
the power issue. But, given the preference of institutions to avoid conflict with
other institutions over non.specific powers, it is not an unlikely result.
174. Although the conclusion indicates that the executive has the power to
suggest immunity regardless of the terms of the proposed statute, it is
recommended that this power be recognized by the Congress and that a clause be
added to the draft legislation similar to that which was added to the Hickenlooper
amendment discussed in the text accompanying note 129 supra.
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by the courts and the executive in resolving sovereign immunity cases.

Since there appears to be no international standard in this field, the
statute does not conflict with that body of law.
Hopefully, before the proposal is submitted to Congress, the State
Department will reconsider its views on absolute attachment immunity and subsequently provide a more satisfactory means for the
execution of judgments. The threshold problem that this legislation
poses is whether Congress has the constitutional authority to enact the
statute. One possible solution is to ground congressional authority in
the commerce clause of the Constitution. Additional authority may
arguably be found in the power to regulate the jurisdiction of federal
courts and the power to declare war.
Nevertheless, there may be problems with the traditional power of
the executive to make a binding suggestion of immunity when a
foreign sovereign is sued in the United States. The courts traditionally
have based the executive power to suggest immunity on policy
grounds rather than on constitutional mandate. Given the constitutional role of the executive as the sole organ of foreign relations,
however, it may be necessary that the executive have pre-emptive
power despite the terms of the statute. Since the immunity cases
indicate that the power is essential to enable the executive to carry
out his foreign affairs power, executive control of immunity then
assumes the status of a constitutional mandate. This conclusion is
supported by the cases that hold an executive determination to be
conclusive.
Richard K. Hines V
Kurt A. Strasser

APPENDIX
THE PROPOSED STATUTE

1 75

AN ACT

To Permit Suit Against Foreign States, Their Agencies And Instrumentalities In Contract And In Tort.
be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America, in Congress assembled, That Title 28 of the
United States Code is amended by adding the following new section:

175.

This statement of the draft proposal is taken from Lowenfeld, supra

note 1, at 936.
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Section 0000. Action against Foreign States, their Agencies and
Instrumentalities.
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the
courts of the States, of any action, regardless of the amount in
controversy, against a foreign state, or an agency or instrumentality of
a foreign state.
(b) Action may be brought pursuant to subsection (a) against a
foreign state, or an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state only
upon
(1) an express or implied contract entered into, to be performed,
or arising out of transactions in the United States; or
(2) a claim for personal injury or death or damage to property
caused by an act or omission of any officer, agent, or employee of
such foreign state while acting within the scope of his office,
agency, or employment within the United States, its territories or
possessions,
under circumstances where the foreign state, agency, or instrumentality, if a private person, would be subject to suit in accordance with
the law of the place where the action is brought.
(c) (1) Service of process may be made in such action by any form
of mail requiring a signed receipt, to be addressed and dispatched by
the clerk of the court to the embassy of the foreign state duly
accredited to the Government of the United States, or to such other
officer or agency of the foreign state as is authorized under the laws of
that state to receive service of process. Proof of service shall include a
receipt signed by or on behalf of the addressee or other evidence of
delivery to the addressee, satisfactory to the court.
(2) A foreign state, or an agency or instrumentality of such state,
shall serve an answer within sixty (60) days after service of process in
the manner described in paragraph (1) of this subsection.
(d) (1) No attachment, injunction, garnishment, or other similar
process, mesne, or final, shall be issued against a foreign state, its
agencies, or instrumentalities, nor shall the property of a foreign state
or that of its agencies or instrumentalities, be subjected to execution
of final judgment unless that state, agency or instrumentality has
expressly consented to such execution.
(2) As used in this section, an agency or instrumentality of a
foreign state shall not include any corporation, partnership, or other
entity having a stated capital or limited liability regardless of the
ownership or control of such entity by the foreign state and no claim
of foreign state immunity shall be allowed in an action against such
corporation, partnership, or other entity.
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Nothing in this section shall authorize the maintenance of an

action without consent against a foreign state, or an agency or
instrumentality of that state

(1) based upon legislation, decrees, or orders of that state,
(2) calling into question the legislation, decrees, or orders of that
state,
(3) based upon a claim arising out of an act or omission of an
officer, agent, or employee of that state in the execution of a public
law, regulation, decree, or order, or the exercise or performance of a
discretionary function or duty,
(4) based upon a public debt of the foreign state.
(f) (1) Nothing in this section shall prevent a foreign state, or any
agency or instrumentality of a foreign state, from consenting to be
sued in the United States upon claims in addition to those authorized
herein.
(2) Nothing in this section shall prevent a foreign state, or any
agency or instrumentality of a foreign state, from consenting to
execution of final judgment, either generally, or upon particular
claims.
(g) Actions under this section may be brought in the Federal district
court for the District of Columbia or
(1) in the case of an action of the kind described in subsection
(b) (1), in the judicial district where the contract was entered into or
where it was to be performed; and
(2) in the case of an action of the kind described in subsection
(b) (2), in the judicial district in which the act or omission took place.
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